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DISABILITY-KENTUCKY STYLE
By ALvmr B. TUcG
Two hundred years ago, Alexander Pope plaintively inquired,
"Who shall decide when doctors disagree?" One year ago a
Kentucky Appellate judge ruefully expressed similar concern.'
Since biblical days, when persuasiveness meant not a "jot or
title" of doubt, our legislators and jurists have been plagued with
legal semantics-with the problem of name tags, guidelines and
definitions. A nearly universal conclusion has been understand-
ably reached, viz.-"He who defines least divines best".2 Par-
ticularly is this true in the nebulous area of personal injuries
involving consideration and definition of such terms as pain,
traumatic personal injury, disease condition, functional or clinical
impairment, and the ultimate determinate-disability.
Recently, this writer had occasion to cross-examine a noted
orthopedic surgeon who had discounted the existence of pain in
a claimant. When asked to define pain, visibly surprised he
hesitated, and then candidly stated, "I am not sure that I can."
3
In a kindred area involving definition of a "traumatic personal
injury," our Appellate Court noted "that slipper word"4--"easier
to discard than to define."- In a more recent decision, the Court
acknowledged the existing inadequacies in definition of a "disease
condition" and produced a thoughtful and incisive review of this
terminology.
6
Even our judicial approach to medical conclusions has been
cautious and guarded by such phrases as "reasonable medical
certainty," a semantical incongruity (since "reasonable" and
"certainty" are mutually exclusive, but even if reconcilable, who
does not recognize that in the entire lexicon of medicine there
can be no such terminology as "medical certainty"). Confronted
*Adjunct Professor of Law, Wallace, Turner, and Trigg, Lexington, Ken-
tucky, University of Kentucky, LL.B., 1947, Univ. of Virginia. Former member,
Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Board.
1 Young v. Stacy, 450 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1969).2 A. Trigg (with apologies).
3 Fritz v. National Linen Serv., Ky. Workmen's Comp. Bd. No. 871860 (1970).
4 Grimes v. Goodlett, 345 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Ky. 1961).
5 Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Ky. 1960).
6 Young v. City Bus Co., 450 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1969).
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with the logical and legal imperfections of such definition, many
Courts (including ours) have altered this requirement to "reason-
able medical probability."7 Even so, the Court has again become
involved in what appears to be hyper-semantics (could have or
did have x condition-might result in or would result in x future
results.) Unfortunately, as the jurist and attorney recognize,
it is not simply an academic exercise in hairsplitting-all too often
the choice of such words may mandate decisions, even though
the intent or true meaning of the medical expert carries a different
connotation, with resulting injustice. Fortunately, many courts
have effectively circumvented this problem by simply asking the
medical witness for his opinion without qualifying or complicating
medical jargon-leaving the Workmen's Compensation Board to
give appropriate evaluation to such opinion."
ThlE KENTUCK HIATUs
The basic impracticality in formulating a set definition of
disability becomes a virtual impossibility in the light of our
existing Kentucky Workmen's Compensation law. Within the
general compensation framework, we have actually developed
three independent categories of claims, to wit: (a) the traumatic
personal injury by accident, (b) the occupational disease claim,
and (c) the schedule injury. The first two have entirely distinct
and autonomous ground rules for filing claims, notice to employer,
limitation of actions, procedure, burden of proof and particularly,
concept of disability. The third system, involving schedule bene-
fits for specific loss of members, invites entirely different con-
siderations in procedure and recovery and is internally com-
plicated by disabilities which extend beyond the loss of the mem-
ber to the body as a whole (which may move the claim from this
category entirely).
It is of historic interest only to consider how these systems
evolved. It is of compelling importance that consideration be
given as to how these systems may be restructured to bridge this
awkward and unnecessary hiatus between various compensation
claims. While this should be the theme for a different article, it
7 334 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1960).8 R ogers v. Sullivan, 410 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1967).
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would appear germane to our consideration of "disability" to
digress slightly and consider some positive steps and suggestions
which might be considered in reviving and restructuring this
system:
1. Abolish the statutory distinction which relegates claims
to different categories based on etiology, e.g.-injury or occupa-
tional disease.
2. Delete the schedule injury section in its entirety.
3. In lieu of our cumbersome and archaic phraseology which
provides compensation for disability or death resulting from occu-
pational disease, substitute this simple phrase; compensation bene-
fits shall be paid for work-related disability or death.
And what changes might be wrought. To consider a few:
1. No longer would we be concerned with the archaic and
redundant phrase "traumatic personal injury by accident." An
entire volume could be devoted to the issues raised by this
innocuous terminology. Fortunately, our Courts have dispelled
much of the confusion in decisions involving the effect of adding
the word traumatic to the personal injury requirements'-the
meaning of personal injury and the requirements of an accident.10
Nevertheless, old notions die hard (with lawyers and judges) and
many of the issues fostered by this definition continue to recur.
Some are not yet fully resolved. For example, psychic disabilities
and traumatic neurosis from non-impact injuries continue to be
troublesome-also heart attack cases (although enlightened by
the recent and excellent de minimis rule)." The deletion of this
cumbersome phraseology would go unmourned by Bench and
Bar.
2. Equally productive of prodigious litigation is the com-
panion phrase "out of and in the course of employment." These
dual requirements for recovery have bemused and bedeviled
attorneys and jurists since inception of this act.12 Again, our
Appellate Court has diluted much of the astringency in these
twin requirements to recovery,'" but so many deserving claimants
9 See Grimes v. Goodlett* 345 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1961).
10 North Am. Refractories v. Jackson, 346 S.W.2d 10 (Ky. 1961).
"I Hudson v. Owens, 489 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1969).
12 Horovitz, Half Century of Judicial Development, 41 NEB. L.J. 1 (1961).
Is Coomes v. Robertson Lumber Co., 427 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1968).
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have been impaled on the horns of one of these technical require-
ments, and so unnecessarily, since both are addressed to this
simple but ultimate determination, "was the injury work-related."
3. By abolishing the artificial and tenuous distinction be-
tween disability produced by injury and that by disease, no longer
must we first decide the etiology before determining which
ground rules will apply; and the line of demarcation between
disease and injury can be extremely thin. No longer need we
worry as to whether disability resulting from a germ entering
an open cut of a worker should be classified as a traumatic or
occupational disease disability-or whether the inhalation of
harmful fumes produced an occupational disease or traumatic
injury disability. A common and perplexing example is the dis-
ability produced by attrition from continuous performance of
work activities (repetitive sanding of gun stocks produced a wrist
cyst). Our Court concluded in this case'4 that the resultant dis-
ability would be classified as an occupational disease. While
the decision is open to question, its true relevance is recognition
of the difficulty in classification, and the impropriety in per-
petuating this unnecessary and dangerous distinction. It would
be unreasonable to saddle claimant with preliminary determina-
tion (which the Court may later reverse) as to which category
he fits and require that if he guesses wrong, his claim may be
dismissed as premature, or barred for limitations. Equally incon-
gruous is the fact that the claimant may be considered totally
disabled although continuing work for the same employer, or not
disabled at all depending on which category he falls under. By
allowing recovery for disabilities which are work-related, the
question of the etiology would be irrelevant and of course the
inconsistencies and inequities evolved from these separate systems
would vanish with them.
4. The schedule injury provision 5 which undertakes to put
a price tag on disability produced by loss of members had very
little justification in its inception and even less for its preserva-
tion. It is inconsistent with fundamental workmen's compen-
sation principles-it is thoroughly unrealistic to prescribe one
14 Hillerich v. Parker, 267 S.W 2d 746 (Ky. 1954).
15 KY. ETV. STAT. § 342.105 (1969).
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recovery for specified injury to all claimants, regardless of the
disability produced thereby-it creates tenuous, indefensible vari-
ants in awards between the injury which has caused severance
of the member and that which rendered it useless (but does not
involve loss or amputation) -and it is often difficult to establish
whether the injury produced an occupational disability which
extended beyond the member loss to the body as a whole in
order to get a "change of venue" to another provision of the act.
It would appear that neither the claimant, the employer nor
common sense would suffer from desegregating member loss
disabilities from any other type of disability by deleting this
section entirely.
Obviously, the foregoing does not constitute a program-only
an approach, but one which conceivably could be implemented
to achieve this merger of law and common sense. Clearly, there
must be legislative and judicial guidelines in order that such
concepts as disability may be properly developed and adjudicated.
The meaningful question is-how far should our Courts go in
judicially defining disability and establishing a specific test for
all Workmen's Compensation claims.
THE BALANCED FACTOR APPROACH TO DisABILITY
At first blush, one might assume that a general definition of
disability would not be difficult to formulate in the occupational
sense envisioned by our Workmen's Compensation Act, the
essential element being extent of loss of work or earning ca-
pacity. A simplistic suggestion would be that if a claimant
following injury is unable to perform any substantial work
reasonably and regularly available to him, he is totally disabled.
If he can perform some but less than all of such available work,
he is partially disabled. If he is capable of performing all work
activities in the available labor area, which he was equipped to
perform prior to injury, he has sustained no disability. In es-
sence, this is the concept of disability as originally envisioned
and applied in our Workmen's Compensation law (as well as
the predecessor English system).
Understandably, it was enunciated in different legal termi-
nology in our various states, but the common denominator has
[Vol. 59
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been recognition that there are two basic ingredients essential
to proper determination of disability. The first of these essential
ingredients is that each claimant is an individual and unique, and
his disability cannot be gauged on a clinical basis by McBrides'
Tables.'6 No single standard can evaluate the nature and extent
of his disability because claimants come in all sizes, ages and
propensities with varying degrees of education, training, experi-
ence and adaptability, as well as all the physical and mental
quirks and idiosyncrasies, endowed by their Creator in individual
and unequal proportions. Consequently, there could be no single
formula, no basic factor which could be applied as a general
and controlling determinate of a man's disability. The second
essential ingredient is that this unfettered and uncircumscribed
determination of disability should be relegated to the fact-finding
board or tribunal which would (hopefully) consider all the factors
involved in each individual case in concluding the nature and
extent of compensable disability.
Obviously, the strength in this concept rested in its viability
and a recognition that there is no average man or faceless
claimant; and no general formula or conclusion may be considered
universally (or even ordinarily) conclusive of disability. Con-
sequently, these fact finding boards and agencies in the various
states developed their own criteria for gauging the nature and
extent of disability. Among the significant factors, they considered
a claimant's age and education, his pre-injury physical and mental
condition, his entire work history including training and experi-
ence and the pre-injury earnings in such work activities, his post-
injury physical capabilities and activities, his subsequent work
performance, earnings, and his job availability. These considera-
tions coupled with the best medical opinions as to the nature
and extent of impairment (for translation into occupational dis-
ability) enabled these boards and commissions to determine
post-injury earning capacity, i.e. disability. A consideration of our
earlier Kentucky decisions emphasizes their consideration of all
these factors rather than exclusive reliance on any one in reaching
their ultimate determination of the nature and extent of disability.





Although this broad and practical approach appeared to be
both equitable and workable, there were suggestions that the
Court should define disability with more particularity and lay
down some compelling guideline which could be universally
applied as the controlling factor in all such disability determina-
tions. Our Court succumbed to this temptation in the E. & L.
Transport case17 and laid down two unequivocal guidelines,
stating that a claimant would be considered totally disabled,
following injury, if:
1. he can no longer perform his prior work activities; and,
2. he is handicapped or impaired in the performance of other
work activities (this was virtually meaningless since any claimant
incapable of performing his pre-injury activities would necessarily
be somewhat restricted or impaired for some other work activi-
ties).
This decision attracted some academic murmurs, but it was
not until the Leep decision'8 that the impact of this definition
was evidenced, probably because the facts of this case pinpointed
its seeming inequity, both as a matter of law and of logic. In that
case, the claimant, a state patrolman, sustained an injury which
incapacitated him for further field duty as a trooper. However, he
resumed work at less exacting office duties with the same pay. The
Court, applying the E. & L. Transport criteria, stated that Leep
was totally disabled because he was unable to perform his precise
previous work duties (interestingly, the judge writing this opinion
noted his personal misgivings with this rationale). Essentially, the
Court thereby adopted the "related occupation test" as the con-
trolling consideration in determination of disability. Although
it is obviously of great importance to determine whether a claim-
ant can no longer perform the particular work which he was
required to do prior to his injury, few states have considered this
to be the persuasive or sole consideration and it has been soundly
criticized as unduly restrictive in scope.19 The almost universal
17 E. & L. Transport Co. v. Hayes, 341 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. 1960)
18 Leep v. Kentucky State Police, 366 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1962).
19 A. LAsnoN, 2 THE LAws oF Wommoms COMWENSATION § 57.3 (Supp.
1970).
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view is that the total work history of the claimant should be con-
sidered in determining his post-injury work capacity (along with
other factors), and at least a general classification of work which
he is equipped by education, training and experience should be
established (for example, was he a general laborer or in a more
specialized field). Yet the thrust of this decision was that the
prime consideration was not general classification but considera-
tion must be restricted to his capacity to perform the specific
work activities immediately prior to the injury.
Perhaps the most obvious inadequacy in such an approach
is that it virtually emasculated permanent partial disability
awards.20 If a claimant could perform less exacting work in his
general work area but not the previous work duties, he was appar-
ently entitled to total disability benefits. Our Appellate Court sub-
sequently undertook to correct this inadequacy by modifying
and extending the E. & L. Transport definition of disability,
noting that the controlling consideration should be ability to
perform the activities required in the general work classification
rather than the specific job at the time of claimant's injury.
21
In fact, the Court withheld judgment in one instance pending a
specific determination of a claimant's pre-injury general work
classification.22
Although a distinct improvement in definition, the essential
weakness of this test remained, viz., work capacity was equated
with work performance. And while work performance is an
important consideration, it is not the entire or necessarily the
persuasive factor in disability. The claimant might be capable
of actually working following injury at unrelated work activities at
the same or greater wages, and without diminuation of earning
capacity; and more pointedly the difficulties of ascertaining a gen-
eral work classification (excepting in the case of the general
laborer) are evident.
Nevertheless, the Court continued to operate under the Leep
formula with increasing awareness of its frequent inequity in
20 Dep't. of Economic Security v. Adams, 450 S.W.2d 819 (Ky. 1970).21 Parker v. Nehi-Royal Crown Bottling Co., 429 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1968);
Joseph v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 408 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1966); Highland Roofing
& Sheet Metal Co. v. Helms, 407 S.W.2d 132 (Ky. 1966).22 Young v. Stacy, 450 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1969).
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application until 1968 when a majority of the Court concluded
the Leep formula (work performance) for disability should be
abandoned and a different test (wage earnings) imposed.23
ThE LONG LEEP TO OsBom
The factual situation and the issue involved in Osborne v.
Johnson 4 was a familiar one to the Board and the Courts. The
claimant, a coalminer, asserted a claim for permanent total
disability from a back injury. The examining physician designated
by the Board concluded the claimant had a 10% to 15% per-
manent partial disability but noted that he should be doing only
light work and certainly no heavy lifting, stooping, bending, etc.
The Circuit Court sustained claimant's appeal from 15% per-
manent partial disability award by the Board on the theory
that it was his incapacity to perform customary work duties
which was controlling, rather than the estimated percentage
evaluation of disability; and since the claimant was (by this
physician's own admission) incapable of performing the hard,
physical labor required by a coalminer, he was totally disabled.
The Court noted the facts were indistinguishable from the
Deby case, 2 5 which applied the then existing test of work per-
formance (as set out in E. & L. Transport and subsequently
extended). Since this was a proper and mandated conclusion
under the existing law, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision,
but reviewed and revised the law prospectively with new con-
cepts and tests-which we must now consider.
(a) THE NEw ROLE OF THE MEDICAL WmEss
The Court in Osborne initially approved the concept that dis-
ability in Workmen's Compensation Law means occupational dis-
ability rather than functional (or clinical) impairment. This
traditional concept, in practical operation, simply meant that
the doctor's testimony should be addressed to the functional
impairment of the individual and the exclusive responsibility
remained with the Board to translate such opinions and esti-
23 Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968).
24 Id.
25 Deby Coal Co. v. Caldwell, 383 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1964).
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mates into a degree of occupational disability. Actually, it is rare
to find any physician willing to estimate percentages of impair-
ment or disability, either existent or projected as it is inconsistent
with his training and his medical experience. At most he may
venture to say "he might do some light work if there is any
available," or "I doubt if he should undertake any work that
involves heavy lifting or strain at this time," or "we would like
for him to start out with some occasional work and perhaps in
time he can reach substantial work capacity;" but this is as far
as most doctors will venture. Every practicing attorney and
every reviewing judge is familiar with the essential medical
reply as to percentage of disability, viz., "I wouldn't know his
job requirements or how well he could perform them. I can
describe his condition as I see it but it is up to you fellows to
determine how disabled that makes him for occupational pur-
poses." Occasionally, some hardy physician would estimate a
percentage of disability based upon his capacity to perform his
customary work duties, and the Court quite reasonably said that
it was admissible for him to give such an opinion if he knew the
work activities involved conceding it might be helpful for the
Board to have the benefit of such opinion; but the Court did
not usurp the Board's prerogative to consider this in reaching
their own determination of the degree of occupational disability
from all evidence of record.26
While ostensibly approving this translation concept, the
Osborne decision actually rejected the foregoing procedure in
presentation of medical opinions as to impairment and percentage
of disability, no matter how informed or helpful. Instead, the
Osborne decision concluded:
The doctor's testimony should be addressed to the question
of what job requirements the injured man is physically cap-
able of performing (taking into consideration his qualifica-
tions and training). The board's determination of the extent
to which the man's earning capacity is impaired then should
be made on the basis of evidence as to the existence in the
local area or region, of regular employment opportunities for
the type of work the medical testimony shows the man is
2
6 Griffith v. Blair. 430 S.W.2d 337 (Ky. 1968).
1970]
KNTucKY LAw JoutNALV5
capable of performing, and the prevailing wage rates in such
employment.
27
In a footnote the Court adds this qualification: "Medical per-
centages still would be significant in apportionment cases."28
It thus becomes abundantly clear that the doctor is now cast
in a vastly different role, one which is both unfamiliar and
uncomfortable for the reasons heretofore noted. His testimony
is limited, not to the clinical impairment with which he is
familiar, but the translation of this medical determination into
work capability with which he is not concerned (or equipped to
estimate). If the literal language of the Court is applied, what
happens to our traditional concept that the Board shall be the
sole arbiter of the nature and extent of occupational disability?
Why the radical departure from the traditional role of the phy-
sician in such cases? And why would his estimates of clinical
impairment (whether couched in actual figures or general ca-
pacity statements) not continue to be helpful to the Board in
the ordinary case as well as the apportionment case (where man-
dated by law)?
(b) The New Disability Formula
Having reaffirmed its preoccupation with occupational dis-
ability, the Court addressed its intention to the new tests which
would be determinative of such disability, and dipped heavily
into Larson in announcing these controlling criteria. Because of
the reliance of the Court on this authority, we quote the cited
passage from this test:
Compensable disability is inability, as the result of a work-
connected injury, to perform or obtain work suitable to the
claimant's qualifications and training. The degree of disability
depends on impairment of earning capacity, which in turn
is presumptively determined by comparing pre-injury earn-
ings with post-injury earning ability; the presumption may,
however, be rebutted by showing that post-injury earnings do
not accurately reflect claimant's true earning power. 29
27 432 S.W.2d at 803 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 803 n.2.
29 Id. at 802, quoting from A. LAwoN, supra note 19, § 57.00.
[Vol. 59
SYNTosImU ON WoRKaM-'s COMPENSATION
The Court slightly oversimplified this language in its an-
nounced conclusion that its only concern need be:
To what extent has the injured workman's earning capacity
been impaired? And it would seem that it would involve
only these determinations: (1) what kind of work normally
available on the local labor market was the man capable,
by qualifications and training, of performing prior to injury;
(2) what were the normal wages in such employment; (3)
what kind of work normally available on the local labor
market is the man capable of performing since his injury;
and (4) what are the normal wages in such employment?30
In more succinct language, the Court rephrased this proposi-
tion as follows:
If the board finds that the workman is so physically impaired
that he is not capable of performing any kind of work of
regular employment or if the board finds that regular em-
ployment in the kind of work the man can perform is not
available on the local labor market, the man will be con-
sidered to be totally disabled. Otherwise, he will be con-
sidered to be only partially disabled. And the percentage of
his partial disability will be determined by the ratio of the
prevailing wage rates in the kind of employment available
to him, to the wage rates earnable by him before being in-
jured.31
The Court further emphasized its complete rejection of the
job capacity factor by announcing that no significance would be
given to the workman's usual occupation except as it concerned
comparative wages before and after injury (the new test of
disability). Undoubtedly the most unequivocal commitment to
the comparative wage earnings as the sole determinate of dis-
ability appeared in this strident summation, "From the foregoing
discussion, a conclusion would seem to be that if the injured
workman for the present time can earn the same wages as before
being injured, he is not disabled at all for Workmen's Com-
"132pensation purposes.
80 432 S.W.2d at 803.
S1Id.
82 1d. at 804.
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True, the Court did concede that a permanent injury of
appreciable proportions could reduce future earnings, and there-
fore suggested that the Workmen's Compensation Board "can
and should make an allowance for some degree of permanent
partial disability on the basis of the probability of future impair-
ment of earning capacity as indicated by the nature of the injury,
the age of the workman, and other relevant factors?" 3 However,
the Court specifically limited such an award to cases where there
had been no reduction in income. To put it simply, it means
that a claimant must obtain no award (because there is no dis-
parity in pre-injury and post-injury wages) before he may be
eligible for this somewhat nebulous allowance for future im-
pairment. One wonders, as a practical matter, what proof
would be required to establish the probability for future im-
pairmen; what would be the predictable basis, the proper per-
centage; what would be the persuasive testimony as to this
future occurrence, its nature and extent; and how could it ever
achieve the requisite standard of probability? In fact, the writer
has been unable to find one instance either in the cases appealed
or the myriad of Board decisions since Osborne where such an
allowance has been awarded under this provision.
In its final effort to make this wage test more acceptable, the
Court indicated that post-injury earning capacity is to be based
upon normal employment conditions, undistorted or complicated
by business boom, good luck, sympathy or efforts. In the light
of the Board's preoccupation with wages as the sole and com-
pelling criterion of disability, it would appear that such factors
would not be persuasive of total disability where post-injury
earnings were comparable to those preceding the asserted dis-
ability.
In concluding this opinion, the Court conceded that under
this test full recompense would be denied the claimant because
no consideration is given to reduction of job opportunities as a
result of the injury, but concluded that "the inclusion of this
factor would require use of a highly complicated formula by no
means accurate in result. The Workmen's Compensation law
has never proximated the giving of full compensation for the
33 Id. (emphasis added).
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losses attributable to disability."8 4 In somewhat paradoxical lan-
guage, the Court added that "the approach adopted in this
opinion comes closer to fair compensation than one in which
the workman gets only an allowance for partial disability even
though he can't get a job or one in which the workman gets an
allowance for total disability even though he can get a job."
35
The final pronouncement of this Court noted that this holding
in no way affects the rule in occupational disease cases as stated
in Allen v. Commonwealth.36
(c) ANAYsis
In attempting an analysis of this important decision which
brings new perspective and procedures into our Kentucky Work-
men's Compensation law it is not suggested that the Osborne
criterion of disability (based on wage earnings) is not an im-
provement over the Leep test (based on work performance).
It is respectfully suggested that in repudiating one test as
too narrow and unrealistic, the Court may have substituted
another formula only slightly less restrictive in scope; and thus
perpetuated the inherent weakness in Leep. It is understand-
able why the wage formula carries such an immediate ap-
peal. It is a comfortable test affording a mathematical formula
for gauging disability in terms of wage earnings with such
mathematical precision that it could easily be computerized.
There is a sonorous ring to the phrase "the best evidence of a
man's capacity to work is the fact that he is working." Our early
decisions recognized the inherent practicality as well as appeal
in this consideration. However, they also recognized while a
pursuasive factor it was by no means the controlling or exclusive
factor in determining disability.
3 7
It is abundantly clear that Osborne not only places the
premium on wage earnings, but it also virtually emasculates other
considerations as a persuasive of disability. For example, the Court
noted its complete rejection of the job capacity factor by an-
nouncing that no significance would be given to the claimants
84 Id.
35 Id
36 425 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1968).
37 Seligman Distrib. Co. v. Brown, 360 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1962).
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usual work except as it concerned comparative wages before
and after injury. It must be evident that true earning capacity
(or disability) isn't always reflected in the cold statistics of
wages before and after injury and available jobs.-8 To note a few:
1. Economic necessity. The inability to support his family
on small Workmen's Compensation benefits may compel the
totally disabled employee to attempt some type of work to
survive. Yet, under this uncompromising formula, any employ-
ment income from any source would automatically classify him
as not totally disabled. Essentially, it rejects our original concept
that a claimant need not be reduced to a vegetable or abject
helplessness in order to be considered totally disabled since
there are few injuries so disabling that a claimant is precluded
from performing any type of work. 9
2. Employer assistance. Employers, frequently and com-
mendably, will rehire a disabled employee at the same wages
subsequent to injury and give him light work or a nominal job.
Again, the rigidity of this formula would preclude adequate or
any recovery even though the disability was evident in the
diminution of work capacity.
3. Lowered productivity. Again, the employee, incapable
of performing work duties demanded of his job may succeed in
maintaining it by working longer hours or with the assistance of
fellow employees, and thus maintain the same wages for an
indeterminate period.
4. Discourages rehabilitation. Perhaps the ultimate weakness
in exclusive reliance on earnings as the determinate of disability
is the fact that it frequently discourages the efforts of an injured
man to rehabilitate himself or to follow his physician's advice to
attempt some activity or some light work. If he undertakes
either, he is penalized rather than applauded for his efforts by
having award denied or diluted; certainly this would appear to
be contrary to the basic philosophy of workmen's compensation
benefits which encourages the employee's effort to rise above
38 A. LASON, supra note 19 at § 57.21 warns:
It is uniformly held, therefore, without regard to statutory variation in
the phrasing of the test, that a finding of disability may stand even when
there is evidence of some actual post-injury earnings equaling or exceed-
ing those before the accident.
89 Peabody Coal Co. v. Taulbee, 294 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1956).
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his handicaps and rehabilitate himself. At one stage, legislation
was designed to encourage re-employment of the disabled by
transferring payments of such awards to the Special Fund.
While impractical in operation and subsequently repealed, the
basic concept (to encourage re-employment efforts of the dis-
abled) remains fundamental to Workmen's Compensation law.
Although the Court gave passing reference to Larson's recog-
nition of these as factors,40 it is evident that they are rendered
meaningless by the absorption of this decision with wage earnings
as evidenced by the Court's generalization that if he is earning
same wages after injury, a claimant isn't disabled at all. The
inherent weakness of the Osborne test is that it confuses earnings
with earning capacity, which Larson emphasized are not synon-
ymous, 41 and tends to overlook his warning that earnings are at
best presumptive and not conclusive of disability.4
Another aspect of this new definition invites practical con-
sideration, viz., "available work on the local labor market which
claimant is capable of performing."43 How is this determined?
De we adopt the Social Security claims approach of bringing in
labor experts to determine available jobs? What are the geo-
graphic limits of the local labor market? And more to the point,
how does the doctor, in his newly found role as expert on job
capabilities advise as to the capabilities of a claimant for such
jobs until he is apprised of their nature and availability? And
does the availability of jobs in an area necessarily suggest that
such jobs are available to an impaired or disabled applicant?
A familiar and practical example should illustrate this point. A
coal miner sustains an injury which precludes performance of
many former work activities, but the defendant establishes that
there is mine work available to a man with his impairment in
this area. This would deny recovery to the claimant unless he
could prove that the job was not available to him, an evidentiary
burden which is both difficult and unfair.
Further evidence of the Court's preoccupation with earnings
as the sole criterion of disability appears in its announced con-
40 Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968).
41A. LAnsoN, supra note 19 at §§ 57.30-57.31.
42 Id.
43 Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968).
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clusion that partial disability will be governed by the same
formula, viz., wage earning ratio before and after employment at
available jobs. This would appear contra to KRS § 342.110, which
provides:
compensation payable under this section shall not be affected
by the earnings of the employee after the accident, or after
his disability from an occupational disease, whether they be
the same or greater or less than prior to the accident or dis-
ability from an occupational disease.
44
Kentucky cases emphasize this point noting that there is no
prohibition against consideration of earnings under the total dis-
ability section (KRS § 342.095) as there is under the partial dis-
ability provision (KRS § 342.110).
How can the Osborne language be reconciled with these
legislative and judicial provisions? The conclusion must be that
Osborne's earnings test can apply only to total disability awards
and does not apply to permanent partial disability claims. The
practical question then arises-one must first establish whether
the disability is total or partial before knowing whether earnings
are relevant, yet earnings are the basic factors under Osborne in
determination of disability. Should a claimant (subsequently re-
employed) then assert in his application a claim for permanent par-
tial disability so as to obviate the defense and relevancy of wage
earnings? Equally disquieting is the Court's candid admission
that a significant area of compensable loss (reduction of job
opportunities as a result of injury) would be denied a claimant
because it would require an additional complicated formula.
CONCLUSION
1. The present posture of our Kentucky Workmen's Com-
pensation law renders disability virtually indefinable. Some sug-
gested improvements are: (a) abolition of the distinctions be-
tween disability produced by personal injuries, occupational dis-
eases and schedule injuries; (b) legislative amendment to allow
recovery for "work-related disability" rather than "traumatic
4 4 Ky. REv. STAT. § 342.110 (1969).
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personal injuries by accident or occupational diseases, arising
out of and in the course of employment."
2. The Osborne decision (our present test for disability) is
somewhat questionable for the following reasons: (a) it tends to
confuse wage earnings with earning capacity, and by overem-
phasizing the former, renders testimony as to medical impairment
and condition, work capacity and performance, reduction of job
opportunities and other disability factors inconsequential; (b)
in its effort to escape the inherent weakness in the Leep test of
disability (overemphasis on work performance), the Osborne test
may perpetuate this original error by overemphasis on wage
earnings.
3. The medical witness should be relieved from his present
role under Osborne, as arbiter of job capacity and return to his
more appropriate role, viz., diagnosing a claimant's existence, con-
dition and impairment, and the Workmen's Compensation Board's
specific responsibility of translating such testimony into terms of
occupational disability should be restored.
4. The Osborne language extends its wage earning formula
to computation of permanent partial disability benefits in viola-
tion of the statutory prohibition contained in KRS § 342.110 and
should be modified or deleted.
Conceivably we may never achieve an acceptable, specific test
for disability. Hopefully, we may find it unnecessary.
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